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I. INTRODUCTION
The President is authorized, pursuant to Section 203 of the Trade
Act of 1974, to restrict imports of a commodity when these imports are
the principal cause of injury to United States firms producing the same
article.' In such an "escape clause" proceeding, the President is to take
into account, inter alia, "the effect of import relief on consumers...
and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles." 2
The International Trade Commission (ITC) makes an initial de-
termination on whether the industry is being injured by imports.3 In
making its injury determination, the ITC shall consider all "relevant"
economic factors concerning the United States industry, including idle
productive facilities, profits, employment, sales, inventories and pro-
duction.4 If the ITC finds injury, it recommends relief to the President
which may take the form of import quotas.5
While the President considers the effect of relief on competition,6
the ITC may have made, at best, a perfunctory analysis of the effect on
competition of restricting imports. For example, the ITC in its 1979
* Ph.D., Harvard; J.D., Yale. The author is an attorney in the Division of International Anti-
trust, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission. This Perspective reflects his personal
views only and does not represent the position of any government agency.
1 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
2 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(4) (1976).
3 "IT]he Commission shall ... determine whether an article is being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the
threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the
imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2551(b)(1) (1976).
4 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1976).
5 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) (1976).
6 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1976).
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report on whether to continue import quotas on specialty steel simply
referred to a staff report which discussed the effect on consumers, and
yet ignored the effect on competition.7 This lacuna in the ITC's report
makes it difficult for the President, who must act within sixty days of
receiving the ITC's report,' to adhere to the statutory requirement to
consider the proposed reliefs effect on competition.
The ITC's failure to assess the effect on competition may be due,
in part, to the lack of a simple method for making such an assessment.
Simplicity is important because of the limited time-six months-
within which the ITC must complete its investigation.9 With this in
mind, I propose a two-step procedure to be used in making injury de-
terminations. For the first step, I propose a simple analytical method
for making an initial assessment of the effect on competition of restrict-
ing imports: the use of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The
simplicity of this tool would ensure its use in each determination, thus
satisfying the statutory mandate that attention be paid in such determi-
nations to the impact on competition. Further, if the finding is within
the safe range of the HHI, such a finding would be dispositive of the
issue. If, on the other hand, the finding is not within the safe range, the
ITC would be alerted at an early stage in the proceedings that further
attention will be required. The second step, a more detailed analysis of
the effect on competition, would be mandated only when a potentially
serious problem becomes apparent through the application of the HHI.
In this brief Perspective, I will explain why the HHI would be an
appropriate tool for the first step of the determination and illustrate its
application by using public data about various types of specialty steel.1
II. CALCULATING THE EFFECT ON COMPETITION
Restricting imports has an adverse effect on consumers, at least in
the short run, because it leads to a price increase in the domestic good
that competes with the import. 1 The price increase resulting from a
7 Stainless Steel andAiloy Tool Steel, No. TA-203-5, USITC Publication 968, Apr. 1979, at
A-65-66. The law does not specifically require the ITC to consider the effect on competition when
it considers whether to recommend the initiation of import restrictions, but the ITC shall consider
all relevant economic factors. 19 U.S.C. § 2551(b)(2) (1976).
8 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1976).
9 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(2) (1976).
10 The ITC, at the request of the President, is now conducting an escape clause proceeding on
specialty steel. 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 56,218 (1982).
11 It is possible that a temporary flow of cheap imports could injure consumers in the long run
by destroying an efficient domestic industry. For an economic analysis of such "predatory con-
duct," see R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141-43 (1970); R.
DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 28-34 (1980).
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particular reduction in the quantity of imports depends both on the
amount by which imports are reduced and on the level of competition
in the domestic industry. The increase in the domestic price associated
with a reduction in imports via import quotas will be more acute in an
industry with few domestic producers than in a competitive domestic
industry.12
Restricting imports into the United States reduces the number of
independent sources of supply. This is similar to the effect of a merger
of competing firms.1 3 Analyzing the economic effects of a merger is not
an easy task. The Department of Justice (DOJ), however, has recently
announced that it will use the HHI in analyzing proposed mergers.' 4
The DOJ stated that concentration-the number of firms in the market
and their respective markets shares-affects the likelihood that one
firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully exercise market
power (i.e., maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time).' 5 The DOJ added that the HHI is superior to the tradi-
tional four-firm concentration ratio test, because the HHI "reflects both
the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the com-
position of the market outside the top four firms [and] gives proportion-
ately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms, which
probably accords with their relative importance in any collusive inter-
action."' 6 These factors would be equally relevant in assessing changes
in concentration resulting from a restriction on imports.
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market
shares of all the firms included in the market. For example, an indus-
try with three firms with market shares of forty percent, thirty-five per-
cent, and twenty-five percent has an HHI of 3450 (402 + 352 + 252 =
3450). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of pure monopoly) to
a number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). The
DOJ has stated that for a post-merger HHI below 1000, the DOJ "is
unlikely to challenge mergers"; for a post-merger HHI between 1000
12 A potential domestic monopolist protected by a tariff can not raise its price above the world
price plus the tariff. A potential domestic monopolist protected by a quota can, however, raise its
price to its profit-maximizing level without fear of additional imports beyond the quota level. For
a technical exposition of this point, see C.P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 130-34
(1968).
13 The legislative reports on the Trade Expansion Act of 1974 do not discuss how the ITC or
the President should analyze the effect "on competition" of restricting imports. See S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119-29 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 44-52 (1973).
14 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines at 3, 16 (June 14, 1982), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg.
28,493 (1982).
15 Id. at 11.
16 Id. at 11-12.
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and 1800, the DOJ "is more likely than not to challenge mergers that
produce an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points"; and for a
post-merger HHI above 1800, the DOJ "is likely to challenge mergers
that produce an increase in the HHI of 100 points or more."' 7
Consider the following example. Suppose there are five United
States producers of a product with each firm producing twenty units.
Suppose further that there is only one foreign firm selling in the United
States and that it sells forty units in the United States. Assuming no
United States exports, United States consumption is 140 units. Elimi-
nating the foreign firm from the United States market and assuming
that its United States sales are distributed among the United States
firms in proportion to their output in the United States gives the follow-
ing results:
Approximate Percentage Share of the U.S. Market
With imports With no imports
Firm A 14 20
Firm B 14 20
Firm C 14 20
Firm D 14 20
Firm E 14 20
Imports 29 0
Thus, the HHI increases from 1831 to 2000 if imports are eliminated.
A merger leading to such an increase would probably be challenged by
the DOJ.
Is there any economic reason for applying a different quantitative
standard when imports are eliminated through quotas than when a firm
is eliminated through a merger? A merger is frequently justified on the
grounds that it will lead to lower costs than if the two firms remain
separate and that it is socially wasteful to have one of the firms build
additional capacity. A similar justification can be made for refusing to
restrict imports, because less efficient domestic firms must expand when
imports are restricted. A lenient merger policy is also justified on the
ground that it provides a check on the performance of potential merger
targets' management. Again, such logic would dictate that imports not
be restricted in situations where a merger would not be appropriate.
Thus, an increase in the HHI that would be cause for antitrust concerns
17 Id. at 13. The Federal Trade Commission has stated that it will give "considerable weight"
to the DOJ's Merger Guidelines. Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal
Mergers 1 (June 14, 1982).
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if it stemmed from a merger would, afortiori, be cause for concern if it
stemmed from a restriction on imports.
III. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE HHI IN USE
This technique may be illustrated by using public data on two
types of specialty steel: tool steel bars and rods, and stainless steel wire
rods. In 1980, there were fifteen United States producers of tool steel
bars and rods. 18 Seven United States firms accounted for approxi-
mately seventy percent of United States production in 1981.11 Total
United States production in 1981 was 67,000 tons. 20 Total imports in
1981 were 27,000 tons,2 coming mainly from eight countries.2 2 As-
suming that the seven largest United States firms are of equal size and
that the eight smallest United States firms are of equal size,2 and as-
suming that in each foreign country only one firm exports to the United
States,24 one can estimate the 1981 HHI including imports. If imports
are eliminated and if the United States firms divide up United States
consumption in proportion to their share of United States production,
one can estimate the HHI absent imports. The HHI increases from 557
to 828, which would not trigger antitrust concerns under the DOJ
guidelines, and so there woild be no need for the ITC to devote addi-
tional resources to an examination of the effect on competition of re-
stricting imports.
Consider, on the other hand, stainless steel wire rod. In 1981, five
United States firms produced stainless steel wire rod.25 Total United
States production in 1981 was 31,000 tons.26 Imports in 1981 were
25,000 tons, primarily coming from six countries. 27 Assuming that all
United States firms are of equal size and that in each foreign country
only one firm exports to the United States, one can estimate the 1981
HHI including imports. If imports are eliminated and if the United
States firms divide up United States consumption in proportion to their
18 Certain Tool Steels from Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany, No. 701-TA-187,
USITC Publication 1288, Sept. 1982, at A-15.
19 Id. at A-23.
20 Id. at A-18.
21 Id. at A-31.
22 Id. at A-35.
23 This assumption leads to a lower estimate of the HHI.
24 This assumption leads to a higher estimate of the HHI including imports and so leads to an
underestimate of the increase in the HHI due to an elimination of imports.
25 Hot-Rolled Stainless Steel Bar, Cold-Formed Stainless Steel Bar, and Stainless Steel Wire
Rodsfrom Spain, Nos. 701-TA-176, -177, & -178, USITC Publication 1254, June 1982, at A-11.
26 Id. at A-11.
27 Id. at A-64.
Restricting Imports
5:510(1983)
share of United States production, one can estimate the HHI absent
imports. The HHI increases from 1188 to 2000, which would trigger
antitrust concerns. The ITC might, therefore, refine its analysis of the
effect on competition of restricting imports by examining such factors
as: entry barriers; concentration trends (including the volatility of mar-
ket shares); technological change; demand trends; market definition;
the homogeneity (or fungibility) of products in the market; the number
of buyers (as well as sellers); the similarity of producers' costs; and the
history of inter-firm behavior, including any evidence of previous price
fixing by the firms at issue.28 In addition, the ITC could ask the Fed-
eral Trade Commission or the DOJ for help in making a more sophisti-
cated antitrust analysis in those cases where the ITC's preliminary HHI
analysis suggests possible competitive concerns if imports are
restricted.2 9
IV. CONCLUSION
These calculations might also be used by the ITC in its other in-
vestigations. A finding by the ITC that there have been unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts while importing goods can lead to a rec-
ommendation to the President that the imports be banned or that a
cease and desist order be imposed after considering the effect of such
relief on the United States economy.3 ° While the countervailing duty
and antidumping statutes do not mention competition, they do instruct
the ITC to "evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bear-
ing on the state of the industry. '31 Moreover, the ITC's rules state that
it will take into account "trade restrictive practices of and competition
between the foreign and domestic producers."3 2
The ITC staff, having access to confidential data on production by
each United States firm and on sales in the United States by each
foreign firm, could do a more sophisticated calculation of the HHI. It
could also estimate the HHI resulting from any specified level of im-
ports from different countries.33 These calculations, which can be
28 See generally Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers (June
14, 1982).
29 19 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
30 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1981).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (Supp. V 1981).
32 19 C.F.R. § 207.27 (1982).
33 At the request of the Federal Trade Commission, the ITC calculated the changes in the
HHI for four carbon steel products in the recent countervailing duty investigations of carbon steel
products imported from the European Economic Community. See the letter from ITC Chairman
Eckes, Aug. 17, 1982, to FTC Chairman Miller (a copy of this source is on file in the offices of the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
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quickly done, might help the ITC-and ultimately the President in "es-
cape clause" and "unfair methods of competition" cases-to decide
whether additional efforts should be made to determine the effect on
competition of restricting imports.
